I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Fourth Amendment concept of constructive entry, which was analyzed for the first time in the scholarly literature in an article published in 2010, police outside of a dwelling are prohibited from engaging in tactics that coerce a suspect to exit that dwelling in order to make a warrantless public arrest. 1 It was not a new concept at that time, having been applied by several courts during the previous two decades, but it had not been discussed directly by legal scholars as a solution to a vexing Fourth Amendment problem that is at least 60 years old. presents a good opportunity to reassess the constructive entry concept, analyze the criticism directed at the doctrine, and urge the U.S. Supreme Court to step in and resolve the long-standing conflict and disarray among the federal and state appellate courts. In undertaking these tasks this article will: (1) review the fundamental Fourth Amendment problem that arises out of warrantless doorway arrests; (2) review the key Supreme Court decisions that guide the search for a solution to this problem; (3) review the constructive entry concept as an approach to the problem in a way that is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and fundamental Fourth Amendment principles; (4) analyze and evaluate the Second Circuit's critique of constructive entry; and, (5) articulate the precise issues that need to be addressed by the Supreme Court in order to resolve this fundamental problem.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PAYTON RULE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENTRY
It is well established that the reasonableness concept in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence calls for a balancing of interests with respect to the protection of privacy in a variety of contexts. That balancing is between the privacy interests of citizens and the public's interest in effective law enforcement, especially with respect to the need to arrest those suspected of committing a crime. It is likewise well established that the level of the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections afforded to occupants of a dwelling is much higher than those afforded to individuals in public spaces. In the context of a dwelling, on the other hand, the balance heavily favors the occupants, whose privacy rights are afforded an extremely high level of protection. In addition to the requirement of probable cause, the rule in Payton v. New York requires that, absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain an arrest warrant from a judicial official before entering a dwelling to make a routine felony arrest.
11
The significance of this is that a judge or magistrate-not a police officer-must determine that the evidence against the suspect is sufficient to constitute probable cause before the police are permitted to enter a dwelling to arrest that suspect. 
14
In the Payton case, detectives had probable cause to believe that Payton was the perpetrator of a murder. 15 They went to Payton's apartment to arrest him without first obtaining a warrant. 16 When no one answered their knock on the door, the detectives forced their way in with crowbars. 17 Although they did not find anyone inside the apartment, they did find in plain view evidence 11 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) . In this context, "routine" excludes cases in which exigent circumstances exist. See id. 12 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Bratt v. Genovese, 660 Fed. App'x 837, 841 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17); Call, supra note 2, at 340 (discussing the purpose of the warrant requirement and arguing for a rule that enhances the incentives for the police to obtain a warrant); Marino, supra note 2, at 571; Nathan Vaughan, Overgeneralization of the Hot Pursuit Doctrine Provides Another Blow to the Fourth Amendment in Middletown v. Flinchum, 37 AKRON L. REV. 509, 516 (2004) . In addition to obtaining a warrant based on probable cause, the police must have a reasonable belief that the suspect is at home before entering that home to carry out the arrest. United States v. Taylor, 497 F. (1980) . 15 445 U.S. at 576. 16 Id. 17 
Id.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2017.552 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu of the crime, which they seized. 18 Payton was arrested at a later point in time. 19 The trial court found that the forcible entry was authorized by a statute that permitted warrantless entries into a dwelling for the purpose of arrest under the same circumstances as an arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant; the court concluded that seizure of the evidence was proper under the plain view rule. 20 In Riddick v. New York, police officers acting without a warrant went to Riddick's house to arrest him. 21 When his young son answered the door, the officers looked into the house through the open door and seeing Riddick sitting on a bed, entered the house and arrested him. 22 While inside, the officers searched a chest of drawers and found illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. 23 The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible on the grounds that the entry was permitted by state statute, and the search was permitted as a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 The Court of Appeals of New York upheld both convictions under the state statute that permitted warrantless entries for the purpose of an arrest. 25 The court concluded that this statute was valid under United States v. Watson, reasoning that an in-home arrest and a public arrest were sufficiently similar to justify treating them the same. 26 The court supported its conclusion by references to common law practice, contemporary practice in sister states, and similar statutes in other states. 27 In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision. 28 In doing so, the Supreme Court disagreed with the state court's 18 445 U.S. at 576-77. For a discussion of the "plain view" rule, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325-29 (1987) ; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) . 19 445 U.S. at 578. 20 Id. at 577-78. 21 Id. at 578. 22 Id. 27 Payton, 380 N.E.2d at 310-13. 28 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) . conclusion and every point of its rationale. 29 Instead, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." 30 Looking for guidance from the well-established rules governing seizures of tangible property, the Court drew a clear distinction between seizures of objects in a public place on the one hand and searches and seizures of objects in a home on the other.
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Well-settled rules permit the seizure in a public space of property in plain view because such a seizure "involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable . . . ." 32 However, the rules regarding searches and seizures of property inside a home are the polar opposite in the sense that such actions are presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. 33 The Court found that this clear distinction between seizures of property in public and searches and seizures inside a home "has equal force when the seizure of a person is involved." 34 This is because an entry into a home to arrest implicates the same privacy interests as an entry into a home to search for and seize property. Both involve "an invasion of the sanctity of the home." violated when that home is entered without a warrant, whether the entry is to search for and seize tangible items or to seize an occupant.
The Court also disagreed with the other reasons cited by the New York Court of Appeals in support of upholding the warrantless entries. 38 The Court noted that the clear support of Congress and a majority of states for warrantless public arrests was absent with respect to warrantless entries into a dwelling for purposes of arrest.
39
The Court also cited disagreement among common law commentators and a lack of authoritative case law in support of such entries. 40 The evidence suggests that at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted "the prevailing practice was not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when authorized by a warrant." 41 With respect to the contemporary positions on this issue in other states, the Court noted that while a majority of states permit a warrantless entry for routine arrests, this number was declining and fell far short of the level of support for warrantless public arrests upheld in Watson.
42
Following the Payton decision, it is clear that under the Fourth Amendment there are two fundamentally different rules governing arrests. Watson permits warrantless public arrests based on probable cause. 43 Under the Payton rule, in the absence of exigent circumstances police may not enter a dwelling without a warrant to make a felony arrest. 44 This distinction shows why the police have an incentive to get a suspect (inside a dwelling) to exit the dwelling. Arresting them outside, in public, obviates the need to obtain a warrant. The potential in this situation for the police to use coercive tactics from outside the dwelling to compel the suspect to exit creates a problem that the constructive entry doctrine is intended to address.
B. The Payton Rule and Constructive Entry
The appellate reports show that some police are evading Payton's warrant requirement by engaging in tactics that are intended to coerce a suspect to exit the 38 Id. at 588-90. 39 Payton, 445 U.S. at 598-601. 40 Id. at 593-97. 41 Id. at 598. 42 Id. The courts are deeply divided over whether this violates the Fourth Amendment. Some courts take a narrow view of Payton that permits such tactics if the police do not physically cross the threshold and enter the dwelling.
46
These courts emphasize the firm line at the entrance to the home and find that so long as the police do not cross that line, there is no Payton rule violation.
The justification for this narrow view of the Payton rule has been undermined completely over the last half century. Prior to that point the Court's "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass," 589-90 (Mich. 2007 ). In the Payton decision, the Court emphasized the relevance of the "unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home," and the "firm line at the entrance to the house" in distinguishing public arrests on one hand from in-home arrests and searches for goods on the other. As the discussion in this article will show, the existence of this boundary contributes to the problematic aspects of implementing the Payton rule. See, e.g., Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (involving a suit against a police officer brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) In that case the Court expressed the need to protect a home's privacy from being eroded by the use of police technology, which in that case was employed while the police were outside the home.
53
Whether the means of coercing an occupant to exit the dwelling are "high-tech" 54 or the more common "low-tech," 55 such tactics should not be considered free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny merely because the officers using them stay outside of the dwelling's "physical dimensions."
Other courts hold a much broader view in finding that tactics that coerce or attempt to coerce an occupant to exit the dwelling and move into public space (in order to arrest him without a warrant) violate the Payton rule because they are as intrusive as an actual physical entry. 56 For these courts, the Payton rule can be violated in this situation even though the police do not physically cross the threshold.
57
This is because such coercive tactics "accomplish the same thing" 58 and have the same effect as an actual entry.
59
Most of the courts that embrace this view from a trespass framework only in cases where the police use high-tech devices to invade the privacy of a dwelling). (1982) . Not all of these cases involve a situation in which the occupant exited the dwelling. In some cases, the occupant never exited the dwelling or even opened the exterior door so there was no warrantless public arrest, but there was nevertheless an issue whether or not the occupant was seized while inside the dwelling. That doctrine is the focus of this article.
In a typical case that gives rise to a constructive entry, the police, acting without a warrant, approach a dwelling in which they believe a suspect is located, with the intent of coaxing him to exit the dwelling to make a public, warrantless arrest. In 60 At the federal appellate level, the doctrine is expressly recognized by the Sixth, Ninth, and order to accomplish this goal, the officers engage in a variety of coercive tactics from outside the dwelling. Courts that accept the constructive entry doctrine see that the Payton rule may be violated in such a situation, although they hold divergent views on the circumstances under which the doctrine applies.
61
The constructive entry doctrine is grounded in two concepts that lie at the heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: privacy and seizure. Both should be briefly reviewed in order to understand constructive entry.
C. Constructive Entry, Privacy, and Seizure
Privacy rights in one's home are afforded the highest level of protection under the Fourth Amendment. The right to be secure at home has been described by the Supreme Court as resting "[a]t the very core" of the Fourth Amendment.
62
The ideas of privacy and security are best captured by the concept of refuge, 63 the right to be left alone. It is the right to be "free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
64
This refuge is obviously disturbed by a physical entry into one's home, which is the "chief evil" that the Fourth Amendment is designed to guard against. 65 Although a constructive entry does not entail an actual entry, it does disturb the privacy of the home's occupants. In a typical constructive entry case, the police remain outside the dwelling and engage in a variety of tactics designed to coerce a suspect into exiting the dwelling. A review of the cases on the subject shows an array of such tactics, including knocking or pounding on the entry door, 63 In Payton, the Court remarked that an "overriding respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." Payton, 445 U.S. at 601. Although sanctity has obvious religious connotations, it is also the root word of "sanctuary," the meaning of which includes the secular idea of "a place of refuge or asylum. By their very nature, these actions disturb an occupant's refuge in essentially the same way that it is disturbed by an actual physical entry into the dwelling. Even if the occupant remains within the private space of the dwelling and does not exit, these police tactics, occurring entirely outside the dwelling, disturb an occupant's refuge and thereby violate his or her privacy rights. The violation is exacerbated when the occupant is coerced into giving up that refuge (and privacy within the home) entirely and moving into public space only to face a warrantless arrest. Thus, even without an actual entry, police actions outside a dwelling may disturb the refuge and violate an occupant's privacy rights, accomplishing the same harm as an unauthorized physical entry, which is precisely what Payton was intended to prevent.
In many constructive entry cases, the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, but instead of first obtaining a warrant, they proceed to the suspect's home with the intention of getting him to exit the home in order to make a warrantless public arrest. Disturbing the refuge associated with the home is a serious constitutional matter and for nearly seventy years the Supreme Court has made it clear that a judge or magistrate, not a police officer, is to make the determination of whether probable cause exists before that refuge is disturbed.
71
While exigent circumstances in exceptional cases may result in the occupant's right to privacy being outweighed by the public's interest in effective law enforcement, the Court made it clear that such circumstances do not include the inconvenience or "slight delay" that obtaining a warrant would entail.
72
Courts that consider a constructive entry to be a violation of the Payton rule use the Fourth Amendment concept of seizure to ascertain whether or not such a violation has occurred. A useful starting point in the consideration of key Supreme Court cases on the law of seizures is United States v. Mendenhall.
73
In this case the defendant was approached in an airport concourse by two federal drug enforcement agents who asked to see her identification and airline ticket. After a brief encounter, she accompanied them to an interview room for further questioning. The majority opinion offered some examples of factors that "might indicate a seizure." 78 These include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."
79
After reviewing the facts in the case, the Court found that "nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse [area] and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that the agents' initial approach to her was not a seizure."
80
Focusing on whether the person believed they were free to terminate the encounter and leave works relatively well in an airport concourse, sidewalk, or other open public spaces where walking away from an encounter is a realistic option, but in a situation where walking away from the encounter is not a realistic option, the 74 This issue was critical because at that point there was no legally sufficient justification to seize her. If she was seized during the concourse encounter, it would be in violation of the rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551-52. 75 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. 76 Id. at 554. 77 Id. This objective test focuses not on what the suspect believed but on what a reasonable person in these same circumstances would have believed. 78 Id. 79 Id. The Court gave no indication that this multiple list of factors was exclusive. Indeed, subsequent to the Mendenhall decision lower courts from time to time have added additional factors to the list. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. This multi-factor approach to determining whether or not there was a seizure is at the heart of the constructive entry concept. It is also the reason the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterizes the constructive entry concept as "muddled," even though in that case the court used the same multi-factor analysis to determine whether or not the suspect had been arrested while inside his home. See infra notes 229-31, 234-37, 243, 272-78 and accompanying text. 
81
The Bostick case involved an encounter between two uniformed sheriff's deputies and Terrance Bostick, a passenger on an intercity bus.
82
The officers boarded the bus during a stop in Fort Lauderdale. 83 Acting without reasonable suspicion they approached Bostick, who was seated on the bus, and asked to see his identification and bus ticket. 84 He complied, and after the officers returned the documents, they asked, again without reasonable suspicion, for consent to search his luggage for illegal drugs.
85
He consented to the search, which gave rise to the question of whether or not he had already been seized before he consented.
86
The Florida Supreme Court held that "Bostick had been seized because a reasonable passenger in his situation would not have felt free to leave the bus to avoid questioning by the police."
87
The United States Supreme Court rejected this "free to leave" approach and, instead, focused on the underlying "principle that those words were intended to capture." 88 The "free to leave" formulation is suitable on a sidewalk, airport concourse, or other public place because asking whether in the face of police actions a reasonable person would have felt free to walk away is a way to ascertain the 81 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 82 Id. at 431-32. 83 Id. at 431. 84 Id. at 431-32. 85 
Id.
86 There was conflicting evidence about whether Bostick had been advised of his right to refuse to consent to the search and whether he had ever consented. Id. at 432. Both of these issues were resolved in favor of the state by the Florida courts. Id. Subsequent to the Bostick decision, the Supreme Court decided that police do not have to advise citizens of their right to refuse to consent to a search. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) ; Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) . 87 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 433. This court went on to fashion a per se rule that a seizure occurs whenever the police board a bus, question passengers without reasonable suspicion, and obtain consent to search their luggage. Id. This was based on Bostick's argument that using the "free to leave" formulation, within the confines of an intercity bus, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave "because there is nowhere to go on a bus" and that if a passenger were to exit the bus "he would have risked being stranded and losing whatever luggage he had locked away in the luggage compartment." Id. at 435. 88 Id. at 435. If the encounter is on a bus or similar situation, where the person is seated and "has no desire to leave," it is not an accurate measure of that effect because the restraint on the person's freedom of movement is not the result of the coercive police conduct. 90 It is the result of the decision to travel by bus, a "factor independent of police conduct." 91 The Court stated that in this situation "[t]he appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 92 This is a manifestation of the "crucial" test that applies in any setting, namely "whether . . . the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about this business. '" 93 In other words, on a sidewalk or other public space, walking away or leaving is a manifestation of the citizen's refusal to participate in an encounter with the police and, at the same time, an exercise of one's freedom of movement. On a bus, where leaving is not a reasonable option, that refusal will be manifested in a different way. To be sure, beyond not replying to the officer's questions and, instead, staring at the back of the seat in front, staring out the window, or opening a book or newspaper and reading (or pretending to read) it, the bus passenger has limited options to manifest his or her refusal. In this situation there are very limited ways to "go about one's business." Although the majority of the Court expressed some doubts that Bostick had been seized, it remanded the case to the state courts to determine, under the test it articulated, whether or not Bostick was seized prior to his consent to the search. 94 In the case of a possible constructive entry, we have a situation that is similar, but not identical, to a passenger on a bus who is approached by the police. As we saw in the Bostick case, the "free to leave" formulation will not be useful in determining whether a seizure has occurred. It makes little sense to inquire whether a reasonable person inside a dwelling felt free to leave the dwelling, because exiting the dwelling by "walking away" or "leaving" and moving into public space to face arrest would not manifest an occupant's desire to "terminate the encounter." 95 The 89 Id. at 435-36. 90 Id. ironic and problematic aspect of this is that the suspect "walking away" (essentially exiting the dwelling) is exactly what the police are trying to accomplish. Therefore, when the suspect is inside a dwelling, an intention to terminate the encounter should be manifested in a different way. With respect to an occupant of a dwelling, going about one's business is accomplished by ignoring the police outside, staying inside the dwelling, and enjoying the privacy-and the sense of refuge-that comes with it. Thus, the appropriate inquiry to determine whether the occupant of a dwelling was seized, which would constitute a constructive entry, is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the police actions and go about his business within the dwelling. Although some courts continue to thoughtlessly apply the "free to leave" language from Mendenhall in such cases, 96 many courts appear to realize that the desire to enjoy the privacy of the home is manifested by staying inside, rather than leaving that home.
97
This critical distinction can be summarized as follows: a seizure in a public setting is an unreasonable interference with one's freedom to leave, while a seizure in a home is interference with one's freedom to stay.
Putting these concepts into practice is challenging because of the possibility that exiting the dwelling may be consensual. Exiting a dwelling might be the product of coercive police actions, actions that convey to a reasonable person that compliance with the police "requests" to exit is required. In such a case, a constructive entry has occurred. On the other hand, exiting the dwelling might be the product of the occupant's free will and a willingness to cooperate with the police requests, rather than the result of coercive actions. If exiting the dwelling is consensual, there is no seizure, no violation of the occupant's privacy rights, and no violation of the Fourth Amendment. This matter will be considered below in the context of applying the constructive entry concept.
Among the courts that have accepted the doctrine of constructive entry (or at least provisionally accepted it), there is disagreement on where to draw the line between police actions that constitute a seizure and actions that do not constitute a seizure. Put another way, there is a conflict among the courts regarding when an occupant's choice to open the door or exit the dwelling is a consensual act or the result of coercive police actions. The Supreme Court has never considered the issue of constructive entry, so it is necessary to look to the lower courts for guidance on this matter. nine armed police officers surrounded the defendant's home, used a vehicle to block the driveway, aimed spotlights at the house, and used a bullhorn to "summon" the defendant to exit the house. 108 The court held that the officers' "show of authority" 104 Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1164, 1165 (avoiding the use of constructive entry terminology in the majority opinion, the court describes the police officers' attempts to coerce the defendant to exit his dwelling between 2:30 and 3:00 A.M. when the defendant was seized inside his dwelling); Jerez, 108 F.3d at 687 (discussing a situation in which officers knocked on the entry door after 11:00 P.M. . 1989) , the court stated that the police "asked" the occupants over loud speakers to exit their trailer. Using the term "asked" rather than "commanded," "demanded," "requested," "ordered," or "summoned" without specifying the exact words the police used, makes it difficult to assess the correctness of the court's characterization. Id. at 1446. This, in turn, makes it difficult to determine the level of coerciveness in a When the defendant opened the door, the officers asked him to step specific case. This is one of the reasons that the analysis of United States v. Allen is problematic. In that case the court never specified the precise words used by the police. See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text. 109 Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1164. For a discussion of whether not feeling "free to leave" a dwelling constitutes a restraint on a person who does not wish to leave, see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. The court did not consider this police conduct to constitute a constructive entry.
116
The defendant's actions were consensual.
117
In United States v. Saari, decided by the same court, four officers approached the defendant's apartment with weapons drawn.
118
One of the officers knocked forcefully on the door and identified himself as a police officer.
119
When the defendant opened the door, the officers pointed their weapons at him and ordered him to step outside with his hands in the air.
120
Rejecting the government's claim that the defendant's actions were voluntary, the court found instead that the defendant responded to "coercive authority" when he opened the door and exited the dwelling.
121
In United States v. Grayer, the same court ruled that when four officers and a police dog approached the defendant's house, knocked on the door, and asked the defendant to step outside and speak with them, there was no constructive entry.
The court reiterated that if an occupant "willingly and voluntarily" acquiesced "to non-coercive police requests to leave the protection of the house," there was no constructive entry.
123
The presence of a brandished firearm is not determinative. Although courts find a constructive entry in nearly every case in which the officers point a firearm at an occupant, there are several cases in which the officers are armed but do not point a firearm at the occupant, and the court makes the same finding. The court found the actions to be a constructive entry.
128
A review of the cases suggests that not only is there no one determinative factor, but there is no consensus among the courts on how much weight to place on the various existing factors, both the ones specified by the Supreme Court in Mendenhall and those subsequently added by the lower courts. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the cases that involved an overwhelming show of force and threats of force, 129 we find cases in which there are as few as two officers, no threats of force, and no weapons drawn, yet the court finds a seizure taking place inside the dwelling 130 or holds that a jury could find that opening the door was not a voluntary act.
131
The disarray that is observed among the courts relating to the constructive entry doctrine is caused, in part, by the discrepancy in the way that courts determine whether a seizure has occurred. In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court stated that a seizure of a person is triggered when, "by means of physical force or a show of authority . . . , [one's] freedom of movement is restrained."
132
Many lower courts, on the other hand, state that a seizure is triggered by a show of authority or coercion. This difference in terminology is significant. Presumably these courts equate coercion with physical force or threats of force. Certainly, these things are typically coercive. The problem is that this formulation suggests that a show of authority is distinct from coercion-that is, a show of authority alone is not coercive. In fact, a show of authority by a police officer may be just as coercive as physical force or the The assertion of authority by a uniformed officer may be highly coercive in the sense that he overcomes the occupant's free will to stay inside the dwelling with the door closed. 134 If more courts recognized a show of police authority as inherently coercive, it would make this area of law more coherent and, at the same time, slow the erosion of the Payton rule. Moreover, social science research over the last half-century strongly suggests that a police officer in uniform, with a weapon and a badge, is inherently a show of authority 135 and can be highly coercive even in routine encounters between police and citizens, particularly with respect to some minority groups. 136 This research suggests that wearing a police uniform and displaying a badge should be added to the list of factors to be considered in determining whether or not the police have seized an occupant inside of a dwelling. With this overview of the Payton rule and the constructive entry doctrine in mind, the next section will present a critique of the recent Second Circuit decision in United States v. Allen.
137

III. CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES V. ALLEN
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Allen highlights the problematic aspects of the Payton rule and, despite the criticism from the majority in Allen, the usefulness of the constructive entry concept in resolving those problems. 
A. The Facts of United States v. Allen
For the most part, the facts of the Allen case are simple and uncontested. The case involved the investigation by local police of an assault allegedly committed by Allen. 139 During the investigation, the police determined that Allen was the perpetrator.
140
Although they had "ample" probable cause to believe that Allen committed the assault, they chose not to seek an arrest warrant. 141 Instead, four officers traveled to Allen's apartment with the "pre-formed plan . . . to arrest him" and take him to the police station for processing.
142
The entry door to Allen's apartment was on the street level. 143 It opened to a hallway and staircase up to the living areas, which were located on the second and third floors of the building.
144
When the officers arrived at Allen's home, they knocked on the entry door.
145
Hearing the knock on the door, Allen stepped into a second-floor porch and looked down at the officers, one of whom Allen recognized from previous interactions.
146
That officer waved to Allen, and in response to something that officer said, Allen traveled down the stairs to the entry door and opened it. Remaining "inside the threshold," Allen spoke with the officers, all of whom remained on the sidewalk, for "five or six minutes" about the alleged assault. 148 139 Id. at 78-79. 140 Id. at 78. 141 Id. According to the Second Circuit opinion, an officer, while remaining outside the threshold, then "told Allen that he would need to come down to the police station to be processed for the assault."
150
The court characterizes the officer's statement as telling Allen that "he was under arrest." 151 Allen then asked the officers if he could go back up the stairs to "retrieve his shoes and inform his 12-year-old daughter that he would be leaving with the officers."
152
The officers informed Allen that he could do so only if they accompanied him. 153 Allen acquiesced.
154
The officers entered the dwelling and accompanied him back up the stairs and into the living area. 155 When the officers and Allen entered the living area of the apartment, "one of the officers asked Allen whether he had anything in his pockets."
156
In response, Allen removed several items, "including seven bags of marijuana."
157
While in the apartment with Allen the officers also saw in plain view drug paraphernalia. 158 Allen was then taken out of the apartment, handcuffed, and taken to the police station.
159
The officers then applied for and obtained a warrant to search Allen's apartment based on the observed drug paraphernalia and bags of marijuana. 160 While executing the warrant they recovered, in addition to the drug paraphernalia, a handgun, which resulted in Allen's 149 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *4. 150 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *5. 151 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79 ("In other words, he was under arrest."). 152 Id. 153 Id. In note 4, the court noted that once Allen was under arrest, the officers were permitted to "remain literally at [his] elbow at all times." Id. at 79 n.4 (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6 (1982)). The court seems to use this action by the police as evidence that Allen was arrested. In other words, if the police say to someone, "We need to go with you," that suggests that the person is arrested. This action would also indicate that Allen was seized, even if not arrested. 154 Id. at 79. 155 Id. 156 Id. 157 Id. 158 Id. 159 Id. 160 Id. In the U.S. District Court, Allen moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an illegal search. 162 After a one-day hearing the court rejected Allen's motion on the grounds that although he had been arrested while inside of his home, "an across the threshold arrest," 163 there was no Payton violation. Taking a narrow view of the Payton rule, the court held that because the officers never physically crossed the threshold "in order to effectuate the arrest," 164 there was no violation. In other words, arresting Allen from outside the dwelling while he was inside does not violate the Payton rule.
Before discussing the Second Circuit decision in this case, some brief attention should be directed at the two highly ambiguous factual aspects of the case. These help to illustrate the substantial difficulty that one encounters in researching the Fourth Amendment issues that arise out of doorway confrontations and, at the same time, point to two of the seemingly intractable doctrinal issues in this area of law. The first problem is that neither the trial court nor the appellate court specified exactly what the officers said to Allen when he was on the upstairs porch that resulted in him going down the stairs and opening the entry door. At one point in its opinion the Second Circuit stated that one of the officers "requested" that Allen come down the stairs to the entry door "to speak with him." 165 Elsewhere in the opinion, the court characterized the initial encounter as one in which the "officers have summoned the suspect to the front door of his home." 166 Further in the opinion the court refers to this situation as one in which officers "call him or her to the door." 167 "Requesting," "summoning," and "calling" an occupant to answer the door all have different shades of meaning and connote vastly different degrees of authority being asserted by the 161 Id. (Allen was charged with the federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).). 162 Allen, 813 F.3d at 78; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *1. 163 The District Court cited California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), as the controlling precedent on the question of whether and when Allen was arrested. Id. at 9. This will be discussed infra notes 181-86, 224-42 and accompanying text. 164 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *1. 165 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79. 166 Id. at 81 ("[W]hen law enforcement officers have summoned the suspect to the front door of his home. . . ."); id. at 82 (" [W] here law enforcement officers have summoned a suspect to the door of this home . . . ."). The court also used "summoned" when discussing the district court opinion. Id. at 80. 167 Id. at 84. officers. As we saw in the overview of constructive entry presented above, the key issue at this point in the doorway confrontation is whether Allen was seized during the process of stopping whatever he was doing, going into the porch in response to the officers' knocking, descending the stairs in response to whatever the officers said to him, and opening the door. Was Allen's free will overcome? At one point in the opinion, the Second Circuit states that Allen "complied," came down the stairs, and opened the entry door. 168 Is "compliance" at odds with the exercise of free will? The key question at this point is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the officers and return to whatever he had been doing inside his dwelling. Neither the District of Vermont nor the Second Circuit considered this question. This issue is critical because Allen may have been seized well before the across the threshold arrest took place. If that were the case, there was a constructive entry by the officers in violation of the Payton rule and that violation occurred prior to the across the threshold arrest. Without knowing precisely what was said that resulted in Allen opening the door, we cannot be certain about whether a seizure took place at that point. 169 Moreover, if Allen had opened the door, exited the dwelling, and been arrested outside his home, being legally seized at the time he opened the door would raise some doubts about whether he exited the home voluntarily, which, in turn, would undermine the validity of the warrantless public arrest. This issue would be critical for those courts, like the Second Circuit, that believe a warrantless arrest outside the home would not violate the Payton rule.
170
The second problematic aspect of the facts is uncertainty over precisely what the police officers said to Allen that constituted his arrest. In its opinion, the Second Circuit states variously that while Allen was inside the doorway, the officers "advised him" that he was under arrest, 171 "told [him] in effect" that he was under 168 Id. at 79 ("Allen complied."). 169 It may be that the court did not view opening the door as a seizure. In the opinion, all of the references to opening the door are in conjunction with the subsequent arrest. For example, the court, in its holding, says that the police may not "cause a suspect to open the door of the home to effect a warrantless arrest. . . ." Id. at 85. On pp. 84-85, in discussing the precedent established by Reed, the court refers to placing the occupant under arrest when he or she "opens the door in response to the police request . . . ." Id. at 84-85. This issue is critical because if the police, instead of arresting Allen while he was standing inside his dwelling, had asked him to step outside into public space and then arrested him, the question of a Payton violation would depend on whether answering the door constituted a seizure. 170 Id. at 78, 87, 89 (concurring opinion). See also Dow, supra note 1, at 18-23. 171 Allen, 813 F.3d at 86 (explaining that the police officers "advis[ed] Allen that he was under arrest"). The officers gave a "command that . . . [Allen] would have to come to the police station with them . . . ," 174 and "[t]he officers then told Allen that he would need to come down to the police station to be processed for the assault. In other words, he was under arrest." 175 But it is not at all clear whether these words were spoken by the officers or are the court's paraphrasing of the officers' words. Did the officers state to Allen that he was "under arrest," or is the court paraphrasing the officers' statements? Does stating to someone, " [you] need to come down to the police station [with us]" 176 without using the word "arrest" constitute an arrest? Allen testified that when he asked the officers if he was under arrest, he was told that he was not.
177
The Second Circuit discredits this testimony in light of the officers' "preformed" plan to arrest Allen. 178 By stating that the officers told Allen that he was "in effect" under arrest, the court creates serious doubt that the officers actually used the words "under arrest." Had the officers used those words, it is likely that the court would have simply stated that the officers told Allen that he was under arrest. Why did the court add the phrase "in effect"? It is most likely because the officers did not say to Allen that he was under arrest. As the Court points out, determining "whether an arrest occurred in, at, or by the threshold . . . presents close fact-finding issues for the district courts." 179 The failure of courts, such as the district court and the Second Circuit in the Allen case, to clarify the language the police use in this situation compounds the problem and makes it exceedingly difficult to resolve these critical legal issues.
B. The District Court Decision
After Allen was indicted for a federal felon-in-possession charge, he moved to suppress the firearm (found in the apartment during the search authorized by the 172 Id. ("after being told in effect that he was under arrest"). 173 Id. at 88 n.11. 174 Id. at 86. 175 Id. at 78. In a later portion of the opinion the Second Circuit again uses the phrase "the officers told Allen that he would need to come down to the police station to be processed for the assault." Id. at 86. 176 Id. at 86. 178 813 F.3d at 78. 179 Id. at 88 (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 6.1(e)). 
180
The district court agreed with Allen that he was arrested while inside his home.
181
In doing so, that court applied the rule on arrest articulated in the Supreme Court decision in California v. Hodari D.
182
In that case the Court held that an "arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."
183
The district court reasoned that by asking the officers for permission to return to the apartment living area, "say goodbye to his daughter, and retrieve his shoes," Allen had submitted to the officers' authority at that point and was, therefore, arrested. 184 However, the district court denied Allen's motion because it adheres to the narrow view of the Payton rule, which specifies that unless the police officer physically crosses the threshold, there is no violation.
185
Focusing on whether the officers had crossed the threshold of the dwelling in the course of effecting the arrest, the court concluded that there was no violation of the Payton rule.
186
C. The Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit decision in United States v. Allen begins by articulating an expansive view of privacy rights in the home. 181 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at 13-14. 182 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 183 Allen, 813 F.3d at 79-80; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *9 (quoting Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626). 184 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *11. 185 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *12-26. 186 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57010, at *26. 187 813 F.3d at 77-78. 188 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 189 Allen, 813 F.3d at 77 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 190 Allen, 813 F.3d at 77 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that Allen was arrested while he was inside his home, 193 adding that neither party disputed this conclusion. 194 However, the court rejects the District of Vermont's narrow view of the Payton rule 195 and, instead, adopts the broad view, which holds that the rule can be violated even if the police do not physically cross the threshold and enter the dwelling. 196 The court notes that the Supreme Court "refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances of actual physical trespass," 197 and that some other federal circuit courts hold a similar view in finding that "officers need not physically enter the home for Payton to apply . . . ." 198 The court goes on to hold "that irrespective of the location . . . of the arresting officers, law enforcement may not cause a suspect to open the door of the home to affect a warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home in the absence of exigent circumstances." In adopting the broad view of the Payton rule, the court observes that the sister circuit courts which have adopted the same view "tend to rely on the legal fiction of constructive or coercive entry . . ."; however, the court rejects this doctrine and, instead, adopts an approach that focuses on whether a threshold arrest occurred while the suspect was inside his dwelling. 200 An analysis and critique of this rejection of the constructive entry rule is presented in this article; however, before that is undertaken it is necessary to discuss the approach that the court utilizes as an alternative to the constructive entry rule. That alternative approach, which focuses on whether there was an across the threshold arrest, will be referred to as the arrest rule.
201
D. The Arrest Rule
In discussing the arrest rule as a preferred alternative to the constructive entry rule, the court begins with a discussion of United States v. Reed, 202 its own "seminal case analyzing warrantless arrests in the home . . . ." 203 This case predates the Payton decision and was, in fact, cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Payton opinion. 204 In Reed, three armed federal law enforcement officers, acting with probable cause but without a warrant, knocked on Reed's apartment door. 205 Although there was conflicting testimony over what happened after Reed opened the door, 206 the federal district court hearing the case concluded that Reed was arrested "when she opened the apartment door." 207 In other words, she was already arrested before the agents spoke to her and before they entered the apartment and took her into custody. The Second Circuit did not elaborate on whether Reed was arrested at Instead, the Allen court found that "Reed was arrested while she stood inside her threshold and officers remained outside of it" 209 and held that "such an 'across the threshold' arrest was unconstitutional." 210 For the Second Circuit, the binding precedent established by the Reed decision is "when officers approach the door of a residence, announce their presence, and place the occupant under arrest when he or she, remaining inside the premises, opens the door in response to the police request, the arrest occurs inside the home, and therefore requires a warrant."
211
In United States v. Allen, the Second Circuit has no doubt and sees no reason to dispute the fact that Allen was arrested.
212
With respect to the issue of exactly when and where he was arrested, the court focuses on the control that the police exercised over him. The court emphasizes that Allen was not free to ignore the police or their command to accompany them to the station.
213
In addition, the court alludes to an objective test for determining whether an arrest has occurred and suggests that in this situation a reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore the police. 214 The court finds that from the point at which he was told that he needed to come down to the police station, Allen's actions were controlled by the police. (Initially this was without physical contact.) His actions in following the commands of the police were not consensual on his part. 215 The court finds that he reasonably believed he needed permission from the officers to go back upstairs into the living area to retrieve his 208 The failure of the Second Circuit to discuss the district court's finding that Reed was arrested when she opened the door may help to explain why the Second Circuit ignored this same issue in the Allen case. It is unfortunate that the court did not carefully look at whether Allen was arrested or, more broadly, seized when he opened the door to this apartment, before the dialogue with the officers across the threshold that, according to the court, constituted an arrest. Under a constructive entry analysis, the actions of going down the stairs and opening the front door may have constituted a seizure and, therefore, a violation of the Payton rule. See supra notes 60-61, 73-97 and accompanying text. See also generally Dow, supra note 1. 209 Allen, 813 F.3d at 83. 210 Id. 211 Id. at 85. 212 Id. at 86. See also id. at 80 n.6 ("[N]either party disputes that Allen was arrested while he was still inside his home."). 213 Id. at 86. 214 Id. 215 Id. shoes, say goodbye to his daughter, and then to go with the police to the station, and could do so only if accompanied by an officer. 216 The court believes that the across the threshold arrest violates the Payton rule because the "result was exactly the same as if the officers had entered the apartment and arrested Allen inside." 217 The control over Allen's actions, which is the focus of the court's arrest analysis, was accomplished while Allen was inside his dwelling. 218 The court offers a second reason why the across the threshold arrest violates the Payton rule. In Washington v. Chrisman, This allows the police extensive control over the arrestee's movements. If an across the threshold arrest were permitted, the court believes that asserting this level of control would "often lead to the very intrusion into the home that Payton warns is the 'chief evil' against which the warrant requirement protects." 221 This is because "a physical intrusion into the home will very frequently follow the arrest." On the question of exactly when the suspect had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that a suspect is not arrested until he submits "to the assertion of authority" by the police or, in the case of a suspect who is unwilling to submit, is physically restrained by the police. 227 Under the facts of the case, because Hodari did not submit to police authority, he was not arrested until the officer tackled and physically restrained him. Under this analysis, the court concludes that "Allen was arrested while standing inside the threshold of his home . . . ."
233
The court's rejection of Hodari is problematic for several reasons. First, the court noted that the Hodari rule was created in the context of a street encounter and that neither of the parties nor the lower court cited any appellate authority for applying it to a doorway encounter. 234 Second, the concept of seizure in Mendenhall, i.e. force or show of authority that makes compliance compelled, is the same basic concept as arrest in Hodari, which holds that an arrest has occurred when the suspect submits to authority or is subdued by physical force. The court rejects Hodari's concept of arrest by claiming that it applies in public but not in a doorway 226 Id. 227 Id. at 626 ("An arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."). 228 Id. at 629. 229 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80 n.6, 87.
230 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) . See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 231 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80 n.6, 86-87. 232 Id. at 80 n.6 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). On the concept of seizure articulated in Mendenhall, see supra notes 73-80. On the concept of seizure used in constructive entry, see infra notes 243-50, 277-86 and accompanying text. 233 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80 n.6. 234 The court refers to the situation in the Allen case as an "in-home encounter," 813 F.3d at 87, and an encounter "in the home," id. at 80 n.6. and then adopts the formulation of seizure in Mendendall, which uses the same basic formulation to deal with a public seizure.
236
The Second Circuit assumes that the rule in Hodari is incompatible with the rule in Mendenhall, but it is not at all clear that these two rules are incompatible. 237 Third, the court observes that the Hodari rule would be "unworkable in the context of an 'across the threshold' arrest" for two reasons.
238
The first reason is that adhering to the Payton rule would mean that an officer attempting to make a warrantless arrest of a suspect who is inside the dwelling "would have to stop at the threshold and allow a suspect to defy arrest."
239
This criticism misses the mark because the same thing can happen under the court's arrest rule when we apply the objective test from Mendenhall. In a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the officer and go about his business, the suspect may nevertheless ignore the officer's commands and refuse to comply. Unless there is an exigent circumstance, which would allow the police to enter the dwelling, the suspect could defy arrest. This outcome seems to be appropriate under the Payton rule. It is therefore unclear how the court's argument supports the Mendenhall rule over the Hodari rule. The second reason the Second Circuit rejected the Hodari rule in an across the threshold arrest situation is that if that rule were to be followed in a doorway encounter in which the suspect refuses to submit to the officer's authority, police acting with probable cause would be permitted to enter the dwelling in order to subdue the suspect with physical force, an outcome that would undermine the Payton rule.
240
This conclusion is problematic. Instead of saying that the Hodari rule would undermine the Payton rule in a situation in which the suspect refuses to submit to the officer's authority, it would make more sense to argue that the Payton rule trumps the Hodari rule in a doorway confrontation, so that if the suspect defies the officer's authority (and assuming no exigent circumstances), the officer would have to obtain a warrant in order to enter and arrest the suspect. This outcome is compatible with the Payton rule. 235 Id. at 80 n.6, 86-87. 236 Id. at 80 n.6, 86. See also supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 237 A detailed analysis of this matter is beyond the scope of this article. 238 Id. at 87. 239 Id. but then adopts the test from Mendendall, which dealt with a seizure in a public space, specifically an airport concourse.
242
The court fails to explain why it rejects one test and adopts a test that is essentially the same. Moreover, Mendendall did not deal with an arrest; it dealt with a seizure that fell short of an arrest. 243 The question in that case was whether Mendendall had been seized when she consented to follow the agents to an interrogation room and (there) consented to a search of her person.
244
This was critical because reasonable suspicion-required by Terry v. Ohio
245
-was absent at that point. The arrest did not occur until after the drugs had been found on her person, at which point probable cause existed.
246
The Second Circuit fails to critically assess whether Mendenhall is appropriate to determine whether an arrest took place at Allen's doorway. In addition, Mendendall relies on a multiple-factor test to determine whether or not there was a seizure.
247
This is essentially the same multiple-factor test that is at the heart of the constructive entry rule the Second Circuit rejects. 248 Finally, Mendenhall uses the free to leave formulation, which was shown to be problematic in Bostick and is problematic in a doorway confrontation situation.
249
The court does not acknowledge this problem, nor does it discuss how the Mendenhall formulation has 241 Id. at 80 n.6, 86-87. 242 Id. at 80 n.6, 86. See also supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 243 Mendenhall deals with seizures generally, whereas the Allen case deals with an arrest specifically. An arrest is a type of seizure. A stop is also a seizure but shorter in duration. In both situations, the suspect's freedom of movement is curtailed. In both situations he is not free to leave. In Mendenhall, the suspect was not arrested until after the drugs in her possession were discovered. The court found that when she was asked by federal agents to accompany them to an interrogation room, she was not seized. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. In using Mendenhall, the Second Circuit is using a test (for seizures) that was not specifically intended for the issue at the center of the Allen case: whether he was arrested while inside of his dwelling. Using the Mendenhall test, the court concluded that Allen was seized, and then it factored in, without any discussion, the duration of seizure to conclude that he was arrested. to be modified in the Allen case, while at the same time adhering to the basic underlying concept of a seizure that the Supreme Court outlined in Bostick. 250 For several reasons, the Second Circuit expresses confidence that the rule from Reed (i.e. the arrest rule) is compatible with related aspects of Fourth Amendment doctrine, such as the rule in Mendenhall, and common police practices. The court finds that because probable cause existed two days before the arrest, there "was ample time to obtain a warrant." 251 Instead of obtaining a warrant, the police went to Allen's home for the purpose of arresting him without a warrant.
252
Any "problems in affecting the arrest" were the result of this decision 253 and not any inherent flaws in the arrest rule. Moreover, in situations where the police initially lack probable cause, but it develops during the course of an encounter with a suspect at the doorway of his home, 254 the arrest rule would be compatible with the exigent circumstances rule, which would permit the police to enter without a warrant if exigent circumstances developed during the encounter. Finally, the court notes that the arrest rule would also be compatible with the police obtaining a telephonic warrant, keeping the house under surveillance until a conventional warrant could be obtained, 255 or arresting the suspect in public if he exits the home.
256
The Second Circuit uses its arrest rule in an effort to protect the privacy rights that are the focus of Payton, specifically the privacy rights of a home's occupants. However, the Payton rule focuses on an entry rather than an arrest. Specifically, it prohibits a warrantless entry into a home to carry out a routine felony arrest. One major flaw of the arrest rule in doorway cases is that the Payton rule can be violated even though there was not an arrest. In both consolidated cases in the Payton decision, there was a warrantless entry in a home. In one of these cases the entry was without a contemporaneous arrest. The police entered Payton's home intending to arrest him, but because he was not at home, the arrest did not occur until sometime 250 See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 251 United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2016). 252 Id. at 78. 253 Id. 254 Id. 255 Id. 
257
The failure to deal with this aspect of Payton means that the court's arrest rule will fail to deal with the many situations in which police actions fall short of an arrest, but arguably violate an occupant's privacy rights, the very rights that are protected by the Payton rule.
Despite the arrest rule's flaws, the Second Circuit applied it to reach the correct result, namely, finding that the across the threshold arrest of Allen (while he was inside his home) violated the Payton rule, 258 but then went on to reject the constructive entry rule as inapplicable, "muddled," and lacking guidance. 259 This raises the question of whether the arrest rule is a better rule than the constructive entry rule the court rejects. An assessment of the court's reasons for rejecting the constructive entry rule will be presented in the next section.
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF REJECTING THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENTRY RULE
In finding a Payton violation, the Second Circuit rejected the narrow view of that rule and, instead, adopted the broad view, under which a violation is not limited to situations that involve a physical entry by the police.
260
The court applied the arrest rule to find a Payton violation, and in doing so reaches the correct result. However, its rejection of the constructive entry doctrine exhibits a misunderstanding of that doctrine. An analysis and critique of this rejection is presented in this section.
In rejecting the constructive entry rule, the court suggests that the rule is overly narrow because it finds a constructive entry (i.e. a seizure) only in cases in which the police use "forceful and compelling" 261 commands "to the occupant to submit to arrest." 262 It is true that the constructive entry rule will find a Payton violation in such cases, but contrary to the court's assertion, it can also find a violation in cases, such as Allen, where the officer's command to submit to custody is "authoritative, 257 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576-77 (1980) . 258 See supra notes 199-222 and accompanying text; Hunt, supra note 2, at 189-92. 259 Allen, 813 F.3d at 87-88. 260 See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text. 261 Allen, 813 F.3d at 87-88. 262 Id. The basis of this claim appears to be the need under the rule to consider a "non-exhaustive list of factors" in determining whether a seizure occurred. 273 It is true that the rule requires courts to consider multiple factors in order to determine whether a suspect was seized inside of his dwelling. 274 In Mendenhall and Bostick, the Supreme Court mandated this approach in ascertaining whether a suspect has been seized. 275 Regarding the arrest, the Allen case was simple, but that does not mean that these many other factors are irrelevant in all cases.
In addition, in the Allen case, the focus on whether or not Allen was arrested while still inside his home may be the reason the Second Circuit ignored another important issue: whether Allen was seized when he went down the stairs and opened the door. Under the constructive entry rule, the occupant's actions and the actions of the police would be relevant, even if he is not arrested while inside his home.
The Supreme Court's mandate to consider multiple factors makes the issue a complex one in many cases; it is difficult to see why this makes it metaphysical or muddled. More importantly, if the constructive entry rule is to be characterized as metaphysical or muddled, it certainly is no more so than the arrest rule. The constructive entry rule is no less clear or less categorical than the arrest rule. This is because for the Second Circuit, the framework for determining whether there is an arrest is the "totality-of-the circumstances analysis" found in Mendenhall. 276 In other words, the court adopts the same basic test that is at the heart of the rule the court rejects. Neither the arrest rule nor the constructive entry rule is able to provide the clear guidance to the courts and police that the Second Circuit seems to prefer, 277 but that is because both of these rules are based on the multi-factor analysis in Mendenhall. 278 Moreover, the list of factors that the court characterizes as creating 271 Id. 272 Id. In Hunt, supra note 2, the author supports the Second Circuit's rejection of a multi-factor approach, but fails to acknowledge that this approach is mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Mendenhall and Bostick. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text. 273 Allen, 813 F.3d at 88. 274 See supra notes 73-80, 96-106 and accompanying text. 275 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436-37. 276 Allen, 813 F.3d at 80 n.6, 86-87. 277 Allen, 813 F.3d at 88. 278 For the constructive entry rule, the test in Mendenhall is modified by the formulation in Bostick in order to accommodate the fact that the manifestation of consent (or refusal to consent) to interact with the Is there a rule that would "provide [the] clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules" that the Second Circuit seeks? It is unlikely that such a rule could ever be developed because of the interplay between the concept of seizure on the one hand and consent on the other. 279 If a suspect invites the police to enter the dwelling or the suspect exits the dwelling, there is no Payton violation if the suspect's actions are voluntary. That is, if a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to exit the dwelling or allow the police to enter, then there is no Payton violation. There are many factors that are potentially at play in making this determination. 280 Which factors are relevant in a particular case depends on the facts of that case. Under the facts of the Allen case, which were fairly simple, the court felt that the whole array of factors that are often considered under the constructive entry rule would add "an additional layer of uncertainty" 281 that would "multiply the difficulties of applying the [arrest] rule." 282 It is true that in a fairly simple case such as Allen there is no need to consider the large array of factors, but a fairly simple case does not make the other factors irrelevant or unnecessary for all cases. 283 If there had not been an across the threshold arrest of Allen and, instead, the police had persuaded him to step outside the apartment and then arrested him in public, the arrest rule would be totally inadequate to deal with the case. Instead, we would have to consider a potentially large array of factors to determine whether Allen was seized when he went into the porch and talked with the officers, when he went down the stairs and opened the door, or when he stepped outside of the apartment. This, of course, would be the process of determining whether a reasonable person would have police is different for a person on a bus or in a home than it is for a person in an airport concourse. See Dow, supra note 1, at 26-30, and supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text. The court's use of Mendenhall without this modification will cause difficulty in its application. 279 See Dow, supra note 1, at 30. 280 The Supreme Court can aid the lower courts by addressing the host of factors that might be relevant and, more importantly, looking at whether or not a police uniform and other manifestations of authority should be included. See Dow, supra note 1, at 36-37. 281 Allen, 813 F.3d at 88. 282 Id. 283 The Second Circuit was lulled into believing that the constructive entry rule was unnecessary in the Allen case because the facts were relatively simple. believed that these actions were not optional on his part-that he was not free to ignore the police and go about his business inside his home.
Finally, the Second Circuit suggests that the constructive entry rule would needlessly add complexity to doorway confrontation cases by adding "an additional layer of uncertainty" to the issue of whether an arrest occurred while the suspect was inside his dwelling.
284
This claim is another indication that the court misunderstands the constructive entry rule. Determining whether an arrest occurred can indeed be difficult. 285 But, the constructive entry rule would not add to the difficulty. It would be used instead of the arrest rule to determine whether Payton was violated. And, it would be able to encompass far more cases-cases in which police actions constituted an arrest as well as cases with a seizure that fell short of an arrest. Without the constructive entry rule, the privacy rights of occupants of homes would be unprotected from the police tactics that gave rise to that rule in the first place.
286
V. CONCLUSION
The law surrounding doorway arrests and the problem of constructive entry have remained unchanged since 2010. The long-standing conflict and disarray among the federal and state appellate courts remain, and the recent decision in United States v. Allen manifests this. The primary problem is the failure of the Supreme Court to address the conflict and clarify the key issues relating to it. To remedy this, the Court should undertake two key tasks. The first task is to resolve the issue of whether the actual, physical entry into a dwelling by the police is a requirement for finding a Payton violation. The trend of the federal courts of appeal is to hold that it is not, but some federal and state appellate courts continue to hold that there is no Payton rule violation if the police do not cross the threshold or otherwise physically enter the dwelling, a position that clearly "undermine[s] the constitutional precepts emphasized in Payton."
287
The second key task is to articulate the appropriate verbal test for ascertaining whether a seizure occurred inside a dwelling. This could be accomplished by 284 Allen, 813 F.3d at 88. 285 Id. (citing LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 6.1(e) ("[T]he need to sort out whether an arrest occurred in, at, on, or by the threshold already presents close fact-finding issues for the district courts."). 286 See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text. for the context of a public seizure, but a seizure would be triggered by interference with the suspect's "freedom to stay" instead of "freedom to leave." In specifying the relevant factors, the Court should reiterate the point, made nearly seventy years ago in Johnson v. United States, 289 that coercion can be found in a show of authority as well as the use or threatened use of force. The empirical research on the matter should prompt the Court to add "wearing a uniform" and "displaying a badge" to the list of factors that should be considered in determining whether police actions seized an occupant inside a dwelling.
Until this is done, the Payton rule will continue to be undermined by those police officers who employ an array of tactics and technologies to coerce occupants to exit a dwelling. This significantly diminishes the Fourth Amendment protection of privacy within a home and marginalizes the courts with respect to the important supervisory role they should occupy over encounters between police and citizens, especially those that take place at the doorway of a home.
